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The law in New York seems to place individual workers entirely
at the mercy of union management, denying them remedy under the
collective agreement however flagrant such abuses of discretion might
be. As has been indicated, the aggrieved party is relegated to an
action at law against the union for damages.
The individual is thus forced to bear the expense of litigation
and the burden of proving fraud or breach of fiduciary duty in dealings admittedly of a discretionary nature, and in which, in the usual
instance, he has taken little active part. Further, should he overcome
these obstacles, he is entitled only to money damages-a remedy not
wholly satisfactory in instances of, for example, wrongful discharge.
The door of abuse would seem therefore to be cast ajar in an
area that has already had occasion to feel the sting of power
misused.59
The need seems clear then for precise regulation of enforcement
procedures under collective agreements that would preserve the basic
rights of individuals to remedy injustices done them and at the same
time retain the overall advantages of the collective bargaining system.
Such regulation, properly, is the task of the legislature.
An amendment to the Civil Practice Act permitting the individual to compel and otherwise affect arbitration proceedings between the parties, upon a showing that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the employee's rights have been violated by the union's
mismanagement of his grievance, would seem to be the most likely
solution. Such an amendment (if possible in the now-existing statutory scheme) would tend to limit direct participation in arbitration
proceedings to those individuals whose rights are clearly endangered.
Neither a flood of litigation nor the consequent collapse of the arbitration system, so feared by the courts, seems likely under such a
provision.

FEDERAL INCOME AND NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY CHARITABLE
TAX EXEMPTIONS: APPLICATION OF THE "EXCLUSIVE"

TEST

The problem herein discussed is one of comparative statutory
construction, centering around the meaning of "exclusive," as used
in Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and Section 420

59 See, e.g., Gregory, FiduciaryStandards and the Bargaining and Grievance
Process, 8 LAB. L.J. 843 (1947) ; Kennedy, Union Refusal to Bargain, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 502 (1958); Tureen, Judicial Intervention in Intra-Union Affairs to
Protect the Rights of Members, 1954 WAsn. L.Q. 440 (1954).

1960 ]

NOTES

of the New York Real Property Tax Law (formerly New York
Tax Law, section 4(6)). These two provisions authorize, under certain circumstances, a tax exemption in their respective areas to organizations which are exclusively charitable in their nature. Such entities have received special income tax treatment in every revenue act.
The present Code, as well as the state property tax law, refers to
organizations which are exclusively "charitable," "scientific," "religious," or "educational." Since the definitions of the terms are
subject to reasonable dispute, a problem of interpretation is thereby
created. This problem has taken on an even greater significance as
the importance of taxation has increased, especially with the relatively recent appearance of the charitable foundation and the corporate donation. This article will examine the general definition of
"exclusively charitable," and more specifically, how courts have construed "exclusive" within the context of income or profit-making
activities of a charity, when applying the exemption provisions of the
New York Real Property Tax Law as compared to the Internal
Revenue Code.
The Meaning of Charity
It is difficult to define specifically what is meant by the term
"charity." This is so, at least partially, because any definition, by
its very existence, is also a limitation. As a result usage of the term
has become very broad and comprehensive.1 The foremost American
legal definition 2 is that of Judge Gray in Jackson v. Phillips: 3
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number

of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of
education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or con-

straint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of
govemment.4

Even this definition, however, in attempting to encompass all the
purposes worthy of inclusion, is, as a result, couched in very broad
and comprehensive language, and hence indefinite. Such a general
definition complicates the precise application of laws which give special treatment to charitable institutions.
The Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation organizations which were formed exclusively for certain named purposes. In
addition to the charitable purpose, the Code enumerates, among others,
I Reiling, Federal Taxation:
A.B.A.J. 525, 527 (1958).
2 Ibid.

What is a

396 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
AId. at 556.

Charitable Organization?, 44
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educational, scientific, religious and literary purposes as being similarly exempted. 5 It would seem, however, that each of these purposes
could be included in the broad definition of Judge Gray. This being
so, there is at least some indication that "charity" itself, as used in
the Code, is a "catchall." The practitioner must therefore look to
the common law for a determination of the tax status of any given
organization. The treasury regulations offer little additional aid to
the construction of "charity," the language there being very similar
to that of judge Gray."
A similar situation exists in the New York Real Property Tax
Law. There also, specifically enumerated purposes, which could be
included within "charitable purpose," are enumerated as worthy of
property exemption. 7 It would seem that under both the Internal
Revenue Code and the New York Real Property Tax Law, the reason
for the seeming redundance was not to limit the all-inclusiveness of
"charitable purpose," but, because of the very vagueness of the term,
to insure that these purposes would be considered charitable.
Meaning of "Exclusive" in the New York Real Property Tax Law
The difficulty of application is increased by the additional condition that the purpose in question be exclusively charitable. To qualify
for special property tax exemption in New York, the
owner must be
"exclusively organized for" a charitable purpose,8 as distinguished
from "organized and operated exclusively'" for a charitable purpose
which is required for federal income tax exemption. 9
The New York exemption, quite distinct from that of the federal
income tax, distinctly severs the "organizational test" from the "operational test." In the federal income tax area, "organized" and
"operated" are two interrelated tests, the operation to a large degree
reflecting the organization.' 0 The charter of an organization is not
conclusive as to the purposes for which it was formed." In New

5 INT. Rav. CODE OF

1954, § 501(c) (3).

6 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (2) (1959).
7 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1):
"Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent,
missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes, for
the enforcement of laws relating to children or animals, or for two or more
such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more
of such purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this
section."
8N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1).
9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §501(c)(3).
10 6 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN § 34.07 (rev. ed. 1957).
11 See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945), cited
in Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 1957), and
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York State, under the property tax exemption provision, however,
even where an organization uses all its property for and is operated
exclusively for a charitable purpose, it will lose its exemption if its
charter is open to a possible construction that is not exclusively
charitable.' 2 The articles of incorporation are conclusive, and the
use of the property does not reflect on the organization.13 Although
there is no express operational test in the property exemption provision, the law does provide for loss of exemption in cases where,
although exclusively organized for charitable purposes, the organization is deemed a guise for profit-making activities. 14 It would seem
that this provision injects considerations in addition to the "organizational test," which is determined solely by the charter. If an organization, though on its face organized for charitable purposes, in fact
operates in a business-like manner, the presumption of its charitable
design may be rebutted. 15 Thus it appears that this is similar to the
exclusively operated test used in the federal income tax area.
Conceding that an organization is organized and operated for
charitable purposes, a further qualification is whether the use of
specific property or a specific item of receipt will subject the property 16 or income 17 to a tax.

The New York Real Property Tax Law exempts property owned
by such a charitable organization, which is used exclusively for

United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421, 424-25 (4th Cir. 1951),
as indicative of the law with respect to charitable exemption of income tax.
The problem there was whether the Better Business Bureau of Washington,
D.C., was exclusively charitable so as to be exempt from social security taxes.
In denying the exemption, the Court pointed out that "in order to fall within
the claimed exemption, an organization must be devoted to educational purposes exclusively. This plainly means that the presence of a single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly educational purposes." Better
Business Bureau v. United States, supra at 283. Thus it would seem that the
"organizational test" is predicated on a devotion to exclusively charitable purposes (meaning enumerated tax exempt purposes), which, it would appear,
may be determined from both the charter and the functions of the organization.
12 Great Neck Section, Nat'l Council of Jewish Women, Inc. v. Board of
Assessors, 21 Misc. 2d 142, 189 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Supp. Ct. 1959).
'3 "[I]t is settled beyond dispute that the right of a corporation to exemption [under the organizational test] must be determined not from its activities
but solely from its articles of incorporation." Id. at 143, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
14 N.Y. RPAL PROP. TAx LAW § 420(1) states, in part: "Such real property [of an exempt organization, though used for an exempt purpose] shall
not be exempt . . . if the organization thereof for any such avowed purposes
be a guise or pretense for directly or indirectly making any other pecuniary
profit for such corporation or association or for any of its members or employees; or if it be not in good faith organized or conducted exclusively for
one or more of such purposes."
Is N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 420(1).
16 Ibid.

17 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 511(a).
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charitable purposes.18 It is sometimes difficult to determine whether
a court is denying exemption because the organization is a mere guise
for profit-making activity, or because the organization, a true charity.
is not using the property for exclusively charitable purposes. 9 Where
an organization's activities are confined to one property, the use to
which it puts that property will determine whether it is a mere guise.
and in such a situation the "use" and the "guise" test, being based
on the same activity, may overlap.
People ex rel. D.K.E. Soc'y v. Lawler 20 is often cited as
an accurate interpretation of "exclusive use" in the property
exemption area. In that case, the petitioner, a society organized for "literary purposes," was, in fact, operated primarily as
a college social fraternity. Accepting the fact that it was organized exclusively for acceptable purposes, the court denied exemption on the ground that the land was not also used exclusively
for such purposes. Suggesting that the use of the property should
be scrutinized with the literal meaning of "exclusive" in mind, the
court went on to say: "[A]Ithough we ought not, perhaps, to give
to the word 'exclusively' an interpretation so literal as to prevent an
occasional use of the relator's property for some purpose other than
one or more of those specified, yet the policy of the law is to construe
statutes exempting property from taxation somewhat rigidly .... , 21
As suggested by the D.K.E. Soc'y case, the word "exclusive"
may not prevent an occasional use of the property for other than
strictly charitable purposes. However, in such a case the use must
be incidental to the charitable purpose. The problem as to when an
activity is more than incidental, like the problem of determining when
an organization is a charity, is susceptible of no precise determination.
In Silver Bay Ass'n v. Braisted,22 the court held that the property of
a summer camp with recreational and farming facilities which realized
a small income from the sale of surplus foods produced on the property was tax exempt. The evidence showed that the primary activity,
in good faith, was the carrying on of conferences for the schooling
and training of religious workers. In a subsequent case, a membership corporation, ostensibly organized for the teaching of metaphysics,
maintained, in actuality, a retreat which reflected the aspects of an
ordinary country club. The court held that the social functions were
emphasized to such a degree that the petitioner could not in good
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1).
19 See, e.g., Peace Haven, Inc. v. Geiger, 175 Misc. 753, 25 N.Y.S.2d 974
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
20 74 App. Div. 553, 77 N.Y. Supp. 840 (4th Dep't 1902), aff'd mern., 179
N.Y. 535, 71 N.E. 1136 (1904).
21 Id. at 557, 77 N.Y. Supp. at 842.
22 80 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
1s
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faith contend that the property was exclusively used for any of the
23
exempt purposes, as designated in the property exemption statute.
It is not to be presumed that any use which produces an income
or profit will destroy the exemption. Quite the contrary: income
derived, even from property itself, may be incidental to, and not reflect on, the charitable use. For example, in Seventh Day Adventists
v. Schenck,2 - profit realized from the sale of milk produced on the
property was considered incidental, and not enough to destroy the
property exemption, where the petitioner was a dairy farming school,
the surplus being produced in the course of instruction. A similar
result was obtained in the Silver Bay case, where the sale of surplus
food products was considered incidental, the bulk being consumed by
the religious trainees. In another farm surplus case, however, People
ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc"y, Inc. v. Mastin, 25 an opposite
decision was reached. At issue in that case was the exempt status
of farm land owned and used by the Jehovah's Witnesses. Food
produced thereon was used in three ways: (1) for students attending
the Bible School of Gilead on the premises; (2) for the Bethel family
in Brooklyn; (3) as surplus sold to the public generally. As to the
first use, the land was assumed properly charitable, but, because the
volume so used was insignificant, it had no effect on the principal
issue. As to the second use, it was held that the "Bethel family"
was for all practical purposes a group of lay employees working for
the petitioner, and not "ministers of religion"; hence, food grown for
their benefit was merely conventional compensation, and the land on
which it was grown did not qualify for any religious exemption.
Finally, in the alternative, the sales to the public were not in any
way sporadic, irregular, or accidental, but rather they represented
a regular and planned income, substantial in nature, and not incidental to the other two purposes. Thus the land was at least partially used for commercial purposes, and could not pass the "exclusive use" test. This part of the decision seemed to be predicated on
a finding that the petitioner was marketing its products in a businesslike manner, and was selling products annually valued at almost
$60,000, or approximately thirty-five percent of the total value of
production. (These figures were based on two farms owned by the
petitioner; only one was involved in this litigation.) This percentage,
said the court, negates any argument that the sales were insignificant
and incidental.
The same question re-appeared in People ex rel. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Harding,26 concerning the tax years
1954, 1955 and 1956. The referee found the property not to be
Peace Haven, Inc. v. Geiger, supra note 19.
304 N.Y. 706, 107 N.E.2d 654 (1952) (memorandum decision).
25 191 Misc. 899 80 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
26 10 App. Div.id 167, 198 N.Y.S.2d 135 (3d Dep't 1960).
23

24
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exempt, apparently relying on the arguments of the earlier Watchtower case. The Appellate Division, however, while recognizing the
referee's arguments, decided against the petitioner on other grounds;
namely, that the land in question was separate from the charity itself
and was used only to support it, and thus was not used exclusively
for carrying out thereupon one of the exempt purposes, as provided
in the exemption provision.
That determination was recently reversed by the Court of
Appeals, 27 which held that such reliance on the word "thereupon"
was unfounded. Contrary to the 1948 Watchtower case, the court,
criticizing the referee's contrary opinion, apparently felt that the
employees of the organization were "ministers of religion." Having
recognized petitioner's status as a charity, the test applied was
whether the land was reasonably incident to the major purpose of its
owner. Quite significantly, the court held that the surplus sales.
amounting to no more than ten percent of the farm produce, should
play no part in the decision. Obviously the Court of Appeals felt
that such sales of less than ten percent were incidental and thus did
not effect the "exclusive use" test. Thus as a practical result, the
Jehovah's Witnesses, by cutting down the percentage of surplus sales
from approximately thirty-five percent to less than ten percent have
left the realm of a business and have become exclusively charitable
within the meaning of the property exemption provision.
Two lunchroom cases, YWCA v. City of New York 28 and Pace
College v. Boyland,29 further illustrate these distinctions. In the
former, the property tax exemption was denied where the institution's lunchroom facilities were open to the public and constituted a
regular source of income. In the latter, however, because the facilities were open only to those connected with the school, the use of
the property was deemed not commercial, even though a commercial
organization operated the lunchroom for the school.
If the use of the land is not incidental to the charitable purpose
of the organization, the fact that the income derived from the commercial use of the property is directed to charitable purposes will not
save the exemption. In People ex rel. The Frick Collection v.
Chambers,30 the petitioner was a tax-exempt art institute that had
People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Socy v. Harding, - N.Y.2d
- N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (November 18, 1960), cited in 144 N.Y.L.J.,
November 21, 1960, p. 13, col. 3.
28217 App. Div. 406, 216 N.Y. Supp. 248 (1st Dep't 1926): aff'd mem.,
245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927). Compare YWCA v. City of New York.
144 Misc. 120, 259 N.Y. Supp. 62 (Sup. Ct. 1932), where the same petitioner
was granted an exemption on properties used as tennis courts that were not
operated as a business or for profit.
294 N.Y.2d 528, 151 N.E.2d 900, 176 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1958); see generally
Sellin, State and Local Taxatim , 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1411, 1416-17 (1959).
30 196 Misc. 1026, 91 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd mere., 276 App.
Div. 891, 94 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1st Dep't 1950).
27

-,
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acquired property on which it planned to expand its facilities. Due
to the high costs of construction at the time, however, it rented the
land temporarily, applying the rental income to its charitable purpose.
In denying an exemption on the property the court refused to consider the designated use of the revenue, holding that to lease property
is an investment and in no way an exclusively charitable use.31 Where
only part of the property is leased, however, that part will be isolated
for tax purposes and the remainder will retain its exemption.3 2 Further, by statute, charities are now allowed to lease their lands to
other charities, provided that the revenue received represents only
carrying, maintenance, and depreciation costs. 3 3

In addition, a few

types of charities are permitted to receive a 34
rental profit where the
profit is used in the furtherance of the charity.
It would seem that if the use is incidental to, and designed primarily for, the furtherance of the charitable design, then the use takes
on the form of the charity itself, despite its commercial nature, and
the property retains its charitable exemption. Such, for example, was
the situation in the Silver Bay, Seventh Day Adventists, and Pace
College cases. 35 If, on the other hand, the primary purpose of the
activity carried on by the charity is to make money, then it will not
be an exclusively charitable use, even though the revenue derived is
used to promote the charity. Such was the situation
in the Watch36
tower Bible, YWCA and Frick Collection cases.
Federal Inconw Tax
At the present time, an otherwise exempt charity will often be
taxed on its so-called unrelated business income.37 Historically,
3' bid.
Misc. 774,
College v.
,nen.,
2 180

Accord, People ex rel. Unity Congregational Soc'y v. Mills, 189
71 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See also People ex rel. Adelphi
Wells, 97 App. Div. 312, 89 N.Y. Supp. 957 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd
N.Y. 534, 72 N.E. 1147 (1905).
N.Y. RFAL PRop. TAx LAW §420(2): "If any portion of such real

property is not so used exclusively to carry out thereupon one or more of
such purposes but is leased or otherwise used for other purposes, such
portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only shall be
exempt . . . ." See, e.g., In the Matter of Syracuse YMCA, 126 Misc.

431, 213 N.Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct. 1925).

(That part of a building leased for

profit was held taxable, the remainder retaining its exemption as charitable
property.)
33 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(2).
34N.Y. REAL PRoP. TAx LAW § 420(5), (6) (referring to rental income

received and used by free public hospitals and libraries respectively).

For

cases illustrating the power of the legislature to grant special property tax
exemptions, see In the Matter of Will of Vassar, 127 N.Y. 1, 16, 27 N.E. 394,
398 (1891); People ex irel. New York Univ. v. Wells, 94 App. Div. 271, 87

N.Y. Supp. 1107 (1st Dep't 1904).
35 See notes 22, 24 and 29 supra and accompanying text

36 See notes 27, 28 and 30 supra and accompanying text.
3 IN'r. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-13.
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however, the scope of the federal income exemption provision has
been confusing. The source of the confusion stemmed from the
Supreme Court's decision in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de
Predicadores.38 In that case the problem was whether a religious
organization was subject to an income tax on revenues derived from
its holdings in real estate and stocks, interests in loans, and from
profits from wines, chocolates, and other small articles sold in its
churches and parsonages. It would seem that the Court granted an
exemption on the grounds that, as to the sales, they were either
themselves in furtherance of the religious purpose, or incidental
thereto; and as to the property interests, such were commonly accepted as proper income-producing activities of a charity.3 9 In other
parts of the decision, however, the Court in more general terms stated
that it is inherent in the nature of a charitable income exemption provision that organizations may be exclusively charitable and have an
income, and that the test of such an exemption is the destination, not
the source of the revenue. These two aspects of the decision gave
rise to the difference of opinion which developed in the federal courts.
The interpretation of the Sagrada decision most widely accepted
thereafter was that the destination of the income should control its
taxable status, regardless of its commercial or non-commercial source.
Thus, in Unity School of Christianity,40 the contention that Sagrada
should be applicable only to non-competitive activities was completely
rejected, and the "destination doctrine" was adopted. In another
now famous case, Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner,41 the Second
Circuit adopted the "destination doctrine" as the ultimate test of exemption even in cases where the activity was otherwise wholly unrelated to the charitable purpose. In that case, however, the dissent bi,
Judge Learned Hand pointed up a strong argument for the restrictive
approach, i.e., that neither Congress nor the Sagrada decision intended to give exemptions wholly on the basis of the destination of
income. Had the Court in Sagrada intended to whole-heartedly endorse the destination doctrine it would not have had to determine
whether the sales involved were incidental or in the furtherance of
the charity directly. Further, Judge Hand argued that at the time
of that case, the then existing revenue law gave a specific exemption
to "feeder-type organizations" dealing in realty rentals and directing
their income to charitable functions. 42 Had Congress intended that
the exemption be based on destination of income, such specific exemption would have been unnecessary.

38263 U.S. 578 (1924).
391d. at 581-82.
404 B.T.A. 61 (1926).
Accord, Sand Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927).
41 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
42

Id. at 779 (dissenting opinion).
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Subsequently, this emphasis on the destination of income received support in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, in
addition to the Second. 4 3 The more restrictive view, that exemption
be based on the source, denying it to unrelated business income, found
support in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as well as in the Tax
Court.4 4 Such a situation in any area of tax law, is always a source
of great frustration for the Tax Court. Though the Court followed
the restrictive approach, it did so subjecting itself to reversal, depending upon the locale of the litigants.
It is apparent that a liberal construction of the Sagrada case
opens the field to flagrant abuse and differs with the New York
policy as to property tax exemption, which does not accept the destination doctrine. Such an inconsistency is more than academic.
For instance, in the YWCA case, and the Frick case,4 5 a property
exemption was denied because the property was used for income
producing activities; yet under the destination doctrine, the income, though defeating the property exemption, would not be subject
to federal tax.
While there are strong arguments for a liberal construction so
as to encourage public charity,4 6 a congressional study revealed that
the destination standard adopted had resulted in several undesirable
practices:
(a) exempt organizations had made investments in real property through
the incurring of substantial indebtedness and lease-back transactions not requiring the use of any funds of the exempt organization;
(b) exempt organizations were using or distributing little or none of their
income for current charitable purposes, but were amassing vast amounts of
money without any apparent limitation;
(c) creators of charitable foundations retained a control which enabled them
to use and manipulate the foundation funds to their own personal financial
advantage; and
(d) certain charitable trusts were established for the principal purpose of
operating family controlled businesses to effectively avoid various taxes other47
wise due.

And finally, as illustrated by the Roche's Beach case, 48 and C. F.
43Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 1957).
44Ibid. See, e.g., Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d
527 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421
(4th Cir. 1951) ; Joseph P. Eastman Corp., 16 T.C. 1502, 1508-09 (1951).
45 See text accompanying notes 28 and 30 mtpra.
4 See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934) ; C. F. Mueller Co.
v. Commissioner, 190 F2d 120, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1951).
47 Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74, 87
(D.N.J. 1956), citing S. Rxx. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. -, U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. (1950) 3078-3092.
4' 96 F2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
(A profitable bathing beach business
whose income was used wholly to finance a charitable foundation was
held tax exempt.)
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Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,4 9 commercial businesses that channeled
their profits into a charitable organization were given an exemption.
The broad construction turned charities into "big business,"
placing them at a considerable competitive advantage, in a position
to destroy tax-paying competition. Further, charities in the liberal
circuits had a considerable advantage over similar charities in restrictive circuits.
The Revenue Act of 1950, embraced in the 1954 Code and reflecting the present state of the law, contained a multitude of modifications designed to eliminate these inequities.50 Now, charities with
the exception of churches, associations of churches, and certain trusts,
are subject to income tax on the income from operations of a business enterprise unrelated to its charitable purposes. 51 As a result.
some of the key cases in this area, i.e., Unity School case, Roche's
Beach case, and C.
F. Mueller Co. case, no longer represent the law
52
as it exists today.
Federal cases and rulings seem to reflect the same standards
in construing "unrelated business" as have been used by New York
courts in construing the term '"exclusive." Thus it has been held
that the income from a school laundry, operated by the school primarily for student use, is tax exempt.53 But the income from a cinder
block plant and radio station, operated commercially by the same
school, is not exempt, even though there was some student training
at the radio station.5 4 These rulings would seem to be in line with
the property tax decisions in the YWCA case and the Pace College
49 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
(A macaroni business that directed all its
profits to New York University for the support of the law school was held

tax exempt.)
50 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 502-04, 511-14 [formerly Int. Rev. Code of
1939, §§ 101, 3813, 3814, 421-23, as amended, 64 Stat. 948, 950, 952, 957, 958
(1950)].
51 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-13.
52 See text accompanying notes 40, 41 and 49 su-pra.
Two questions arise
with respect to the 1950 Revenue Act. First, does this law represent an
interpretation and codification of the congressional intent behind the earlier
law in the area? This argument was rejected in Lichter Foundation, Inc.
v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957), the court there holding that all income accrued before January 1, 1951 is subject to the old laws. Secondly,
where there are exceptions to the new law taxing unrelated business income,

are the parties free to act accordingly, assuming no tax to be applicable, or
will the exemption depend, as before, upon the liberality of a particular
circuit? It would seem that the only logical conclusion would be that charitable activities, not subject to unrelated business income treatment, retain the
charitable exemption regardless of the commercial nature of the activities
from which the income is derived unless the commercial activities are so
extensive that the organization is no longer a charity. See Randall Foundation, Inc. v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1957), where, under a prior
statute, the court held that the commercial activities were so extensive as to
negate a charitable status.
53 Rev. Rul. 55-676, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 266.
54 Ibid.
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case. 55 The Treasury approach appears to be that if the activity
is commercial in nature, it will normally be construed to be unrelated,
depending on the continuity of the activity and its relative size and
nature as compared to the charitable activity. 56 If the income is derived from activities in direct furtherance of the charitable purpose,
57
it will be exempt regardless of the relative size of the income.
However, if the activities are merely associated in some way to the
charitable purpose, then the proportion of their income to the total
income will become decisive. For example, substantial commercial
sales of fertilizer by an organization designed to further agriculture
through instruction could not be justified. 58 Likewise, an exempt
medical research organization was required to pay tax on the sale of
medical photographs to hospitals and patients at commercial rates,
the income representing seventy-five percent of that organization's
total receipts. 59 But an organization formed for the exhibition of
arts, sciences, and athletic events, paid no tax on income realized
from the famed Senior Bowl football game, though the proceeds represented its total income, since such exhibition was an integral part
of the civic and educational program of the organization. 60
Though there would now seem to be a close similarity in construction in both areas of the law, the effects of a substantial deviation from what is exclusively charitable might be considerably dif-

5 See text accompanying notes 28 and 29 supra.
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (4) (1958).
5 See authorities cited note 60 intfra.
58 Rev. Rul. 57-466, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 311.

5 Rev. Rul. 57-313, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 316.

Two recent rulings ind cate

that the Treasury takes a strict approach on the size of the income derived
by a charity from activities merely associated with the charitable purpose. An
exempt organization of horse breeders was forced to pay a tax on the income
from food and drinks served in the clubhouse, as unrelated business, Rev. Rul.
60-86, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 10, at 15, as was a labor union that received
income from a semi-weekly bingo game. Rev. Rul. 59-330, 1959-2 Cut. BULL.
153. This would seem to raise the question of whether such activities would
defeat the property exemption on the building, especially in the latter case.
Would the exemption be lost to the whole union hall, or only to the room in
which bingo is played?
60 Mobile Arts and Sports Ass'n v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Ala. 1957). See also, Rev. Rul. 58-502, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 271, where a
charitable organization for the promotion of a particular sport was allowed
to receive tax exempt income from the promotion of a tournament and the
sale of literature relating to the rules of the sport, both activities being in
furtherance of its charitable purpose. Furthermore, income from radio and
television rights was also tax exempt, such income not being disproportionate
to the size and nature of the charitable activities and merely incidental to its
purpose. Compare People ex rel. Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 App. Div.
312, 89 N.Y. Supp. 957 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd inen., 180 N.Y. 534, 72 N.E.
1147 (1905) ; Rutgers Univ. v. Piscataway Township, 134 N.J.L. 85; 46 A.2d
56 (Sup. Ct. 1946), where school athletic fields, producing income through
outside leases and ticket sales respectively, were denied property tax exemption
because of their income producing nature.
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ferent due to the very nature of the taxes. Under the New York
property tax law, a deviation from exclusive charitable use destroys
the entire property exemption, unless that segment of the property
so used can be geographically isolated; I" under the federal income
62
tax law the exemption is lost only on the unrelated income received.
For example, in the Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Mastin
case,68 the entire farm was held taxable because of the commercial
sale of some of the products grown thereon. Under the federal income tax law, however, only income realized from the sale of the
products to the public would be taxable, while income realized from
other sources not unrelated to the charitable purpose would retain
an exemT)tion. Due to the list of statutory exceptions to taxable
64
unrelated business income such as rentals, annuities, royalties, etc.,
other differences result when applying the income and property exemptions to the same situation. While the leasing of property owned
by a charity would result in a loss of the New York property tax
exemption, the charity would not lose its exemption on the rental
income. This is so even though the lessor be a "feeder corporation"
dealing wholly in realty. 65 Also, a church is given special exclusion
from the unrelated business provisions, 6 but is not given such liberal
treatment under the property exemption law.
Conclusion
While most of the specific exclusions from the federal unrelated
business income section have no counterpart in the New York property tax law, the courts in both jurisdictions have apparently taken
the same approach in construing the exemption provisions within the
context of income or profit-making activities. Cases from both jurisdictions presently reflect a substantial harmony with respect to the
application of charitable tax exemption treatment, namely, that an
activity is qualified for exemption if it is directly in furtherance of
the charity, other than through financial support. In both areas,
an organizational test is the first prerequisite for an exemption,
though in the property field more emphasis is placed on the charter
in determining the organizational purposes. Similarly, the protection
against a property exemption for a charitable "guise" is to some de612 N.Y.

REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(2).
r INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §511(a).
63 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
64 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b).
Included

among the items exnressly
excluded from the unrelated business income section of the Code (§ 511(a))
are dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, rents (on real property), gains
through certain sales or exchanges of property, income through certain types
of research,
and the first one thousand dollars in every case.
65
INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§501(a), 501(c)(2), 502.
GOINT. Rlv. CODE OF 1954, §511(a) (2).
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gree comparable to the federal income "operational" test since it is
the operation which determines whether the charity is in fact a
"guise." Finally, the federal income "unrelated business" test is at
least a partial counterpart to the property "use" test. Only that
part of a charity which is deemed "unrelated business" is subject
to income tax, the remainder retaining its exemption. Likewise, only
that segment of the property not used for the charitable purpose will
be taxed, the remainder again retaining its exemption.

)X
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER IN FELONY-MURDER
AND MISDEMEANOR-MANSLAUGHTER

Early common law grouped homicide cases as (1) justifiable,
(2) excusable, and (3) felonious.' In other words, all homicide
which was not justifiable nor excusable was felonious. 2 Every felonious killing, without further refinement into murder or manslaughter,
was punishable by death; 3 while on the other hand, benefit of
clergy
4
attached even if it was a killing of the most atrocious nature.
However, during the period from 1496 to 1547, a series of statutes excluded from benefit of clergy certain of the more serious forms
of felonious homicide, referring to them as murder committed with
malice aforethought. 5 Felonious homicide was then divided into two
main categories: that which was committed with malice aforethought,
and that which was not. The former was called murder and punishable by death, the latter became manslaughter and was punishable by
branding and imprisonment not to exceed one year.8 Express malice
was defined by Blackstone as "malice . . . when one, with a sedate

deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed
design is evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward
intention; as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and
concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm." 7 Malice afore12 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW
23 HoLDSwoRTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 314 (3d ed.
32

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 450-60.

4 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 44

483-84 (1895).
1927).
(1883).

5 See Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J.
537, 543 (1934). This work is an excellent and extensive study of malice
aforethought. According to the author, aforethought (prepense) was used in
the sense of a design meditated upon for a substantial period of time in advance.
Id. at 544.
74 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *199. The words "express" or "implied"
do not add to the meaning of malice; they are not two separate kinds of malice,
but merely signify the manner in which the only kind known to the law may
be shown to exist.

